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ED CASSITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 8794 
J. J. CASTAGNO, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENT'S S,UPPLEMENT AL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Special Interrogatories and Verdict Thereon. 
The clerk of the trial court failed to include in the 
Record of Appeal, the special interrogatories propounded 
by the trial court to the jury, and the answers of the 
jury thereto. However, Appellant in his brief, at pages 
4, 5 and 6, has correctly t:t·anscribed and set forth said 
interrogatories and answers. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the original interrogatories and answers are not 
included in the Record of Appeal, the Respondent hereby 
approves of the action of Appellant in including the 
same in his brief, and does hereby adopt such action in 
lieu of the inclusion in the Record of Appeal of the 
original interrogatories and answers. 
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2. Plaintiff's Exhibit I. 
Attention is particularly invited to "P Ex I," which 
is a map upon which is delineated the respective owner-
ships of land of Appellant and Respondent involved in 
this action. The holdings of Respondent in this area 
\vhich are of particular concern are as follows: 
(a) The "Exchange property" acquired by Respond-
ent by Patent, dated Dec. 30, 1953, from the 
United States of America, and delineated upon 
said exhibit in pink, bearing the numeral '5"; 
(b) ~rhe "Homestead property" acquired b~~ Re-
spondent by Patent, dated February 6, 1939, 
from the l~nited States of America, and de-
lineated upon said exhibit in pink, bearing the 
numeral "3." 
Upon "P Ex I" is sho'vn a lead pencil line com-
Inencing on the North boundary line of Section 23, Town-
~ hip :2 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake :Jieridian, and 
extending in a X orth,Yesterly direction across the ••Ex-
chang-e ~~ property and ~·Hoinestead .. property of Re-
~pondPnt and thence continuing in a X orfu,yesterly 
direetion to Stansbury Island. This lead pencil1narking 
rPprP~<'ltb~ t IH\ so-called ~·Trail"Tay .. elai1ned by Appel-
lant. It \YH~ placed upon .. p Ex I'~ by the .... \ppellant 
nt thP trial ~B. 67, ()~~ G9~ 70). 
. )
.). ~"'yupplcnlcllfal Eridcnc'c 
F,or <'OllY<\niPnC{\ l~t'~lHHldent has included in the 
:1rgnnH'ntativP port ion of this brief such supple1nental 
P\·idPlH'e a~ lH\ d<'{'l\18 neee~sn.ry for a proper deterinina-
f ion of thi~ ea~t:'. 
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Part A 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT AND 
DEMONS'TRATION OF VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT 
POINT I. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE LAND ACQUIRED BY DE-
FENDANT FROl\1 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY 
PATENT DATED DECEMBER 30, 1953, AND RECORDED 
IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF TOOELE 
COUNTY ON FEBRUARY 15, 1954, IN BOOK 4 F OF DEEDS 
AT PAGE 229, THE PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO TRAIL-
WAY EASEMENT OVER SAME IN SPITE OF THE FIND-
INGS THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS PREDECESSORS 
IN INTEREST HAD TRAILED CATTLE OVER AND ACROSS 
THE SAME FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS PRIOR 
TO MAY 3, 1955, AND NEITHER DOES ANY PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY OR ROAD EXIST OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID 
LANDS. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Defendant acquired the fee simple title to land de-
lineated as "Pink 5" on Exhibit 1 by virtue of the Federal 
patent above described on Dec. 30, 1953 (R. 118). This 
land is particularly described as: 
W¥2 SWlM and SElM SWl;i, Sec. 4, Lots 6, 
7, EY;z SWlM, Sec. 6, NWl;i, SE1;4, W¥2 NE 14, 
SEl;i NEl;i, Sec. 9, SWlM SE 14, NW%: SW%:, 
Sec. 10; NW1;4, NWl;i NE 14, N¥2 SW 14, SW~4 
SvV%:, Sec. 15; NW 14 NW%: Sec. 15; NW 1;4 
NW1;4, Sec. 22. 
(All of the foregoing is situate in Twp. 2 
South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meri-
dian). 
SE%, Sec. 1, Twp. 2 South, Range 6 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Prior to the date of the patent the lands described therein 
were public domain owned by the United States of 
America. The so-called trailway to and from Stansbury 
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Island passes over and .across the land above described 
located in Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, with a compass direction from ap-
proximately the southeast to the northwest. The plain-
tiff definitely marked this position of this trailway on 
P Ex. I and there is evidence that the trallway deviated 
from this course (R. 95). 
Plaintiff's evidence was directed towards establish-
ing a private trailway easement. It was intended to 
support the allegations of plaintiff's supplemental com-
plaint which claimed a private prescriptive easement 
over defendant's lands as appurtenant to plaintiff's 
lands. It is alleged: 
"Plaintiff's cattle have during said period of 
time trailed and crossed back and forth from the 
approximately 5,700 acres of land zchich plaintiff 
ozcns in said Tou·nship :2 South. Range 3 West, 
to his other grazing lands located upon Stansbury 
Island and said use in crossing. trailing and nlov-
ing ahnost continually over and across the land'3 
by plaintiff and his predecessors in interest has 
hec n o J)(! n. under an ad re rse cla iJn of right. knozrn 
and acquiesced iu by defendant and l1is prede-
cessors in interest. and has created by prescrip-
tiou an cascnH'nt orer and across all of said lands 
u·ithiu the al>orc dcscr1~bed area lrhiclz are not 
o1rucd b,11 ~J!aintiff. and 1chich e(~senzent ha~ b.e~ 
('OIIlt and 1s uou· the property rzght of plauzhf1 
in n nd to n 11 8nid port ions of land. That all of 
~n id u~t\ hY plaintiff and his predecessors in inter-
P~ t, ha rc· i)(·c u an ad ve rsc use 1nad e zcith knowl-
(\dg·(\ nt a 11 t inll\8 of the o\\-ner of said lands 
an~i ''"itltont thPir eon8t::"'nt and.per1nission to said 
tt~t lu\in~ tnade. ~~ ( lTnderscoring supplied) (Part I 
of plnin1 iff's First Cross Claim and Counter-
elnint) 
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There is no allegation in the Supplemental Com-
plaint and no evidence in the record which even suggests 
that plaintiff claimed that a public road existed over 
defendant's lands prior to the date of patent thereof 
in 1953. Plaintiff claimed by the allegations of his Sup-
plemental Complaint and his evidence was given to prove 
a private easement - not the existence of a public road. 
There was no interrogatory propounded to the jury con-
cerning the existence of a public road or highway. The 
pertinent interrogatories are: 
"9. Do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors 
in ownership and possession drove or trailed their 
cattle across defendant's lands in going to and 
frorn Stansbury Island 1 (Answer yes or no). 
Answer: 'Yes.' 
"10. If your answer to No. 9 is yes, answer 
the following questions: 
A. Prior to May 3, 1955, did the plaintiff 
and his predecessors in ownership and 
possession regularly use the defendant's 
lands for that purpose for 20 consecutive 
years 1 (Answer yes or no). 
Answer: 'Yes.' 
B. Did the trail, if any, follow the same gen-
eral course and direction during the 20 
year period referred to in the next pre-
ceding question 1 
Answer : 'Yes.' " 
The Court followed the theory of plaintiff's supple-
mental complaint and of plaintiff's evidence in pro-
pounding these interrogatories, and submitted to the 
jury questions which pertained to facts relevant only 
to the question whether a private prescriptive trailway 
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easement appurtenant to plaintiff's lands as the domin-
ant tenement, had come into existence. There was no 
finding as to the existence of a pre-patent public high-
'vay or road over defendant's lands and neither did the 
Court ask for any such finding for two valid reasons: 
(a) plaintiff's supplemental complaint alleged no facts 
upon which such claim could be based, and (b) there 
is no evidence in the record supporting such claim. 
2. CITATION OF A17THORITIES . 
... \. Pri'Gate, prescripti1;e right in the Public 
Domain. 
"It is conceded that title to .... \ppellants' land 
remained in the Lnited States until December, 
1891. * * * This court has repeatedly held that 
a prescriptive right in, to and over real estate 
ean be acquired only after an open, continuous 
and adverse user for a period of 20 years. * * ~ 
It follo"~s therefore that the time at which the 
ref'pondents alleged preseripti\e right commenced 
'Yas in Dece1nber 1891. This falls far short of 
the period of tune required to entitle respond-
ent to a right of 'vay over appellants' land by 
pre~cription, and he n1ust therefore fail upon 
thi~ ground:~ (Lund YS. ,,~ilcox, 34 l~tah 203 ~ 
<)- I~ "") 
. ' . ae. ,),) 
"'Vhil(\ there is no t~Yidence in the record 
~1un,·ing- "·hen the patent "·as issued by the l~nited 
~tah'~ in "·hon1 the original title "\Yas yested to 
rP~pondent'~ land. yt"\t their counsel in their briet 
in rPferring' to this subjeet at page 13. says: 
.ri,IH\ :\lnrphy~ ( rt"\~lHHldents) land "·as patented 
in lS7 -t.' 'rt' n~~tnne this to be the fact. If~ there-
for<\ no tit h' pn~~t'd fro1n tht ... goyerninent of the 
rniff'd ~tnt<'~ to that of priYate 0\Yllership in 
th<' \"(':1 r 1S7 4, tht' right to arquire a. priYate ease-
na\n.t h~r ll~t"\r or pre~~ription dates fro1n that 
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year. * * * If, therefore, we begin with the year 
1875 the twenty year period would end with the 
beginning of the year 1895." (Bolton v. Murphy, 
41 Utah 591; 127 Pac. 335) 
''It may be conceded that plaintiff is sup-
ported by the authorities in his contention that 
an easement by prescription cannot be acquired 
over land belonging to the State or the United 
States, (10 C.J. Sees. 23, 24, pg. 876). Such has 
been declared to be the law of this jurisdiction 
as applied to land belonging to the United States. 
(Bolton v. Murphy supra, Lund v. Wilcox supra). 
The title to a part of plaintiff's land over which 
the defendants clain1 the right to convey the 
\Yater with which to irrigate their land was con-
veyed by the United States to E. W. Tripp, the 
predecessor of the plaintiff, in 1899. The title 
to the other land over \vhich the defendants clain1 
such right was conveyed by the State of Utah 
in 1913. It will be thus seen that, if there was a 
break in defendants' use of the irrigating ditches 
ayross plaintiffs' land from 1907 to 1917 the de-
fendants could not acquire an easement by pre-
scription across plaintiffs' land because there 
could not be a continuous use for a period of 
20 years. As to the land conveyed to plaintiff 
by the State of Utah in 1913, obviously a pre-
scriptive easement could not be acquired up to 
1922 when this suit was begun." (Tripp v. Bagley, 
74 Utah 57,276 Pac. 912; 69 ALR 1417). 
"It is well established as the rule in Utah 
that the prescriptive period is twenty years as 
it was at the common law (citing Utah Supren1e 
Court decision.) (Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 
22; 197 Pac. (2d) 117 at 122). 
B. Highways Over Public Lands. 
"The right of way for the construction of 
highways over public lands, not reserved for pub 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lie use, is hereby granted." (USRS 2477; 43 USCA 
Sec. 932). 
"llighways are distinguished from private 
roads or ways in that the former are intended 
for the use of the public generally and are main-
tained at public expense, as already noted, while 
the latter are intended for the exclusive use and 
benefit of particular persons. -Giving a private 
\\·ay a name does not make it a public highway 
or thoroufare." (25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 
4, pg. 340) 
.. rrhe term ~high,Yay' is, however~ used in both 
a broad and narrow sense. In its broad or general 
~en~e, it covers every common "~ay for travel in 
any ordinary mode or by any ordinary means 
\\?hich the public has the right to use conditionally 
or unconditionally. * * * In a limited sense, how-
ever, the ter1n 1neans a "Tay for general travel 
\\?hich is \\Tholly public. When appearing in a 
general la\Y- it will ordinarily be regarded as 
haYing been used by the legislature in its general 
sen~e. * * :~~:q (~5 __ .:\.Jn. Jur .. Highways. Sec. 3, 
pg. 3-tl) 
"if a 1ray is one orer 1rhich tlze public hare 
a. ,r1c ne ral right of passage. it is in legal contem-
plation a hiplucay, \vhether it be one owned by 
n priYate corporation or one o""'D.ed by the govern-
lltPnt nr a goYPrninentnl corporation, and "~hether 
it he ~ituated in a to\\~ or in the country. Xo 
llHltter "·hether it be e~tablished by prescription 
n r hv d Pd i en t ion~ or under the rights of e1ninent 
doJn;lin_ it is a higlura_11 if there is a geueral right 
to ''-"(' it for trarcl. 7'he n1odc of its creation does 
uof of if."'t'lf iurariab/.11 detcrtniue its character: 
(or this iu pcucra!. ;, .. .- dcter1nined by the riglds 
·~~·hi<·h the publi(' hare iu 1"'t. (lTnderscoring sup-
pliPd) (l~lliott~ R,ond8 and Streets. \-.-ol. l_ Ser. 
:1~ P~· --t-). 
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"In order to constitute a particular road or 
highway a public road and the traffic and travel 
thereon subject to regulation and control by the 
Commission the question is not whether the county 
or state has acquired an indefeasible title, ease-
ment, or right of way, but the question is whether 
the particular road or highway is being used by 
the public generally for travel and traffic and is 
claimed by the public as a public road or high-
way, and as such is being used for the purpose 
of hauling and transporting freight and passen-
gers over it for hire or private gain by those 
owning and using the ordinary and usual vehicles 
used on public highways for such purpose. Any 
road or highway which i's thus being used by the 
public generally is, in my judgment, a public 
road or highway within the purview of the lavv, 
over which the travel and traffic is subject to 
regulation by the Commission. (Emphasis sup-
plied.) (Justice Frick in Public Utilities Com-
mission v. Jones, 54 Utah 111, 179 Pac. 7 45) 
"The term 'public highway' in its broad, 
popular sense includes toll roads, - any road 
which the public have a right to use even condi-
tionally, though in a strict legal sense, it is 
restricted to roads which are wholly public." 
(Weirick vs. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 NW 652, 
22 LRA (N.S.) 1221) 
"The word 'highway' as ordinarily used 
means a way over land open to the use of the 
general public without unreasonable distinction 
or discrimination, established in a rnode by the 
laws of the State where located." (Lovelace v. 
Hightower, 50 N.M. 50; 168 Pac. (2nd) 50). 
"The federal statute involved is as follows: 
'The right of way for the construction of high-
ways over public lands, not reserved for public 
uses is hereby granted.' This is an offer to dedj-
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cate any unreserved public lands for the con-
struction of highways to become effective * * *. 
It is a general rule that acceptance of an offered 
dedication of land for a highway may be estab-
lished h~.r proof of affirmative acts of taking pos. 
S(~ssion by public authorities or by general use 
hy the public, provided the use is sufficient to 
constitute acceptance. (Citing authorities). The 
Supreme Court of the "C"nited States has said 
that such uses 'ought to be for such length of 
time that the public accommodation and private 
rights might be materially affected by an inter-
ruption of the enjoyment.' " (City of Cincinnati 
vs. \Y.hite's Lessee, 6 Pet. ±31, 8 L.Ed. 452. * * *. 
''The United States as a land owner has 
n1ade an offer to dedicate unappropriated land for 
hig]T\\Tays~ if accepted as authorized by this state's 
la"T· 'rhe ease1nent for its use as a public highway 
"Tas created exactly as those (of "\Yhich) the dedi-
cator "Tas an individual land owner. If mere pub-
lic user is sufficient acceptance of an offered 
dedication, the ten year statute of limitations 
i~ not ren1otely applicable. * * * The courts of 
a 1najorit~T of the states "\vhich ha\e had the 
quP~tion for consideration ha\e held that the 
g·pneral rules applies to the offered dedication of 
higlny·a~-~ under the Federal statute involved here. 
( ( 'iiting anthoritit•s) (Lovelace Y. Highto"\Yer. 
~upra) 
'"11 hP <':.1 n~e of action upon "\Yhich plaintiff 
pr<\Ya i 1(\d herein upon a finding that the road is 
a puhlir high"\Ya~T "-a~ not the sa1ne cause of action 
as tiH• niH~ in the for1ner aetion "Thich alleged his 
o\rlll'r~hip of a private right of "\Yay. The proof 
I hat 11·ould hare cstabli.-..'hed one cause of action 
U'OIIld uof hare established the other. The causes 
ol actiou u·crc iu fact inconsistent. since defend-
a.ul cou1d not ha rc <-.,'old and plat~ntiff could not 
hare purchased. a prirate right of 1cay orer a 
10 
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public road. Moreover, a different title was in-
volved in each case, the first a private title, and 
the other a title vested in the public. * * * The 
question of the public character of the road was 
not in issue in the first case and the issue \vas 
not tried. A decision either \vay as to the private 
right clailned would not have determined any 
question as to the public right." (E1nphasis sup-
plied) (Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal. App. 843, 158 
Pac. (2nd) 207). 
"The grant (R.S. 2477, 43 flT.S. CA 932, 
supra) is unconditional and contains no provision 
as to the Inanner of its acceptance. We think it 
quite well settled that when land is granted for 
a right of way for a public high,vay, the grant 
may be accepted by the public without action by 
the public authorities. The continued use of the 
road by the public for such length of time and 
under such circu1nstances as to clearly indicate 
an intention on the part of the public to accept 
the grant has generally been held sufficient more 
especially so if it is made to appear that to inter-
rupt the use would "inconvenience the public.'' 
It must be born in mind that it is not a question 
of the establishment of a highway by prescription 
which is here in question, b~d the acceptance of a 
grant; and therefore it does not depend so much 
on a definite length of time of use as upon the 
character of the use, taking into account the needs 
and convenience of the public) as manifesting an 
intention to accept the grant. (Emphasis sup-
plied) (Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 
165 Pac. 518) (Cf: on rehearing, 25 Wyo. 416, 
171 Pac. 267) 
"A highway is a way open to the puhlic at 
large, for travel or transportation, without dis-
tinction, discrimination or restriction, except such 
as is incident to regulations calculated to secure 
to the general public the largest practical benefit 
11 
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therefrom and enjoyment thereof. Its prime es-
sentials are the r_ight of common enjoyment on 
the one hand and the duty of public maintenance 
on the other. It is the right of travel by all the 
world, and not the exercise of the right, which 
constitutes a way, a public highway, and the actual 
amount of travel upon it is not material. If it is 
open to all who desire to use it it is a public 
highway although it may accomodate only a lim-
ited portion of the public or even a single family, 
and although it accommodates some individuals 
nlore than others." (Emphasis supplied) (25 
An1. Jur. Highways- Sec. 2, Pgs. 339, 340) 
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnes, 75 
Utah 384, 285 Pac. 646 
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 l~tah 585, 290 Pac. 954 
.J erem~- v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 Pac. (2nd) 
420 
O.S.L. Rd. ( 1o. vs. ~Iurray City. ~ l~tah (2nd) 
427, 277 Pac. (2nd) 798 
Leach v. :Jfanhart 102 Colo. 129. 77 Pac. (2nd) 
652 
"C se under private right is not sufficient. If 
the thoroughfare is laid out or used as a private 
"-ay. its use. ho"-eYer long as a pri,ate 'va:~ does 
not 111ake it a public 'yay. l"T se under private use 
i~ not sufficient * • • and the 1nere fact that 
the public n1ake use of it ,,-ithout objection fron1 
the (l\Yner of the land "-ill not 1nake it a public. 
\Ya~". Before it beco1nes public in character th0 
o\\·npr of th~ land n1ust eonsent to the change. 
( l\1 orri~ v. Blunt. 49 l~tah ~-l-~i. 1()1 Par. 1127) 
3. AR.O{Tl\1 ]~~N'r 
.. \. J~ri rate J> rci'\cripticc R iphts on Pub !i.e 
])()JJIOiJl 
ThP nncon troYPrtPd facts in this case absolutely 
deny plaintiff an~· priYate traih,·ay ease1nent over~ upon 
1~ 
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or across lands of defendant above described. Any use 
of these lands by plaintiff and predecessors in title while 
the lands were part of the public don1ain cannot, of 
course, be considered in deter1nining the existence of a 
private prescriptive right. (See authorities cited above.) 
Plaintiff commenced the present action on May 28, 1955, 
by filing his complaint in the office of the Clerk of the 
Court. He served and filed his answer to defendant's 
cross complaint and his supplemental complaint setting 
up his alleged private prescriptive right to a trailway 
easement over said lands on January 6, 1956. The Fed-
eral patent is dated Dec. 30, 1953, and was recorded Feb. 
15, 1954 (R. 118). If plaintiff is allowed the benefit of 
the January 6, 1956 date (date of filing his supple-
mental complaint) instead of May 28, 1955 (date of filing 
his original complaint), the expired time after issuance of 
Federal patent during which plaintiff used defendant's 
said lands is not more than 1 year, 10 months and 21 days 
(time between date of recording patent-Feb. 15, 1954-
and date of filing supplemental complaint-January 6, 
1956). If the period is computed from date of Federal 
patent (Dec. 30, 1953) to date of filing supplemental coin-
plaint (January G, 1956), the result is 2 years and 6 days. 
In either of said methods it is clearly obvious that plain-
tiff has failed in his proof of a prescriptive user of 20 
years or more. The facts and the law, as enunciated by 
the cited authorities, require judgment in defendant's 
favor on this facet and theory of the case. 
B. Highways Over Public Lands 
Plaintiff's cause of action as set forth in his Supple-
mental Complaint alleged facts upon which a claim for a 
13 
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private prescriptive way could b-e based. It is self evi-
dent from the allegations set forth above that the plead-
er's theory was that plaintiff had acquired by over twenty 
Y(~arH continuous adverse user a private prescriptive 
trail \Va~r over defendant's lands appurtenant to plain-
tiff's land located in the area. This claim is defeated by 
the la'v and facts of the case as above demonstrated. An 
PXa111ination of plaintiff's evidence shows it \\"as given in 
Hupport of these allegations and of plaintiff's theory of 
this case. There is not a suggestion or implication in 
plaintiff's evidence that the general public was interested 
or had ever used the alleged trail\Yay. He claimed and his 
evidence u·as directed to pro,ce that he and his predeces-
sors in interest clain~ed a prit·ate right o-cer defendant's 
lauds. The defendant n1et this evidence by counter-posing 
evidence and the Court based his interrogatories on plain-
tiff's theory (Interrogatories 9 and 10). This aspect of 
the case \\Tas tried on the issue "Thether a private pres-
criptive easen1ent exi~ted over defendant's lands~ and not 
on any other theory. 
The authorities above eited definitely differentiate 
l>Pt\\·epn (a) a priYate ease1nent acquired by prescription, 
and (h) a u~Pr h~· the pulJlie of sufficient substance as to 
indiea t <\ an aec<'pta neP hy the public of the offer by the 
llnitPd Ntat<'S under R .. 8. :2477 ( 43 r:.s.C .. A ... ~ Sec. 932). 
lt i~ nppropri:lt<' to repeat here the ad1nonition of the 
\r ~·otn ing ~n prPnH' l~ourt in Hatch Bros. ("~o. v. Black, 
~upra: 
.. , t 1nu~t hP horne in tnind that it is not a ques-
tion of thP (\~tabli~lnnent of a high\Yay by pres-
eri ptinn "·hieh i~ ht're in question, but the accept-
anel\ of a grant *~~~, 
14 
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It will be a va1n search of the trial record to at-
tempt to discover even a scintilla in evidence \vhich \vill 
support a finding that prior to patent issuance to de-
fendant a public highway existed over defendant's land. 
Such evidence is simply not in the record. Evidence sup-
porting a clain1 for a private prescriptive ease1nent \\rill 
not prove the existence of a public high,vay. Each clai1n 
is separate fron1 the other and in fact antagonistic. The 
Court of Civil Appeals of California pointed U!J ~he 
distinction in Ball v. Stephens supra, and the excerpt 
quoted from that decision is not only pertinent to the 
situation in this case, but decisively answers any argu-
ment which plaintiff might present to support a claim 
that defendant took title to his lands under the 1953 
patent burdened by public highway or road. Plaintiff 
in his supplemental complaint never claimed that there 
existed a ''pre-patent" highway under R.S. 2477. His 
entire effort in his pleading and at the trial was to clain1 
and prove a private trailway easement. 
Any argument in support of the "public highway" 
theory in this case fails to find support both in the evi-
dence and in the law. If this action be treated as a law 
action, then there is no finding by the jury as to the 
existence of a pre-patent public highway. The failure of 
the court to submit an interrogatory on this question is 
no fault of the court. It would have been error on its 
part to have done so inasmuch as plaintiff's pleadings 
and his evidence are based alone on the private pres-
eriptive right theory. Neither did plaintiff request the 
Court to propound an interrogatory on the question of 
the existence of a pre-patent public highway. His perti-
15 
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nent requested interrogatories do not contain the words 
'~public highway." They pertain only to private prescrip-
tive rights. The "public highway" theory was not ad-
vanced at trial even by way of argument and certainly 
not by the pleadings or evidence. If this action be treated 
as one in equity the "public highway" theory fails be-
cause there is no evidence to support the finding of the 
pre-patent public user under R.S. 2477. The Court would 
commit gross error in making such a finding. Plaintiff, 
hy means of his pleadings and evidence, lulled both the 
defendant and the Court into the belief that he \Yas re-
lying only on the private prescriptive right theory. The 
pre-patent "public highway" theory and argument comes 
too late to be available to plaintiff. Beyond all per-
adventures defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor 
on this facet of the case. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO PRIVATE PRESCRIP-
TIVE TRAILWAY EASEMENT OVER DEFENDANT'S 
"HOMESTEAD PROPERTY," BEING THE LAND CON-
VEYED TO DEFENDANT BY THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA BY PATENT DATED FEB. 6, 1939, AND RE-
CORDED ON AUGUST 7, 1939, IN BOOK 3 Y AT PAGES 377, 
378, AND NEITHER DID THERE EXIST A PUBLIC HIGH-
WAY OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID LAND PRIOR TO PAT-
ENT. 
1. STATEMENT OF F-~-~CTS. 
Defendant acquired the fee si1nple title to land de-
Jineated as '~I>ink :2'' on Exhibit P Ex. I by virtue of 
Federal patent dated February 6, 1939, and recorded on 
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NW14 SEI4 and SW1;4 NE1;4 of Sec. 15, Twp. 2 
South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and 1feridi-
an. 
rThis land also was part of the public domain ovvned by 
the United States of America prior to the date of the 
patent. It was acquired by defendant under the Federal 
Homestead Law, and is for convenience designated here-
in as ("Homestead" lands). Plaintiff has pleaded a 
private trailway easement over this '"homestead" land 
(See Par. I, pg. 2 of his Supplemental Complaint) and 
attempted proof of facts in the endeavor to establish such 
private prescriptive trailway easement. This alleged 
private trailway easement represents the southeastern 
portion of the same trailway claimed b yplaintiff over the 
lands of defendant particularly described in Point I of 
this brief. The alleged trailway over the "homestead" 
lands is the initial portion of the a1leged "Stansbury 
Island" trailway (P Ex. I). Plaintiff's pleading and 
evidence were solely directed toward claiming and prov-
ing a private trailway easement over the "homestead" 
lands. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record 
with respect to the existence of a pre-patent "public 
highway." Plaintiff requested no interrogatory on the 
question of the existence of a pre-patent public highway 
and the Court propounded none. Plaintiff's relevant 
pleading on this issue is quoted verbatim in Point I of 
this brief. There is no finding by the jury as to the 
existence of a pre-patent "public highway" over and 
across the "homestead" lands. 
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES. 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. ARGUMENT. 
Again plaintiff fails in establishing a private pre-
scriptive ease1nent over and across defendant's lands last 
above described. The homestead patent in defendant's 
favor was dated February 6, 1939, and was recorded Aug-
ust 7, 1939 ( R. 170). Plaintiff filed his Supplemental 
Complaint alleging his right to a trailway easement over 
said land on January 6, 1956. The expired time is there-
fore 16 years, 4 months and 29 days. If the date of the 
patent is taken as the starting point (Feb. 6, 1939) to date 
of filing Supplemental Complaint Jan. 6, 1956, the ex-
pired time is 16 years, and 11 months. Obviously neither 
of said computations yields a period of prescriptive user 
short of the required 20 years. The period of use of the 
defendant's lands by plaintiff and predecessors \vhen 
title to same was in the United States cannot be and is 
not counted in determining the time of adverse user. 
(See authorities cited in Point I supra). In the first 
instance it is 3 years, 7 months and 1 day short. In the 
second instance it is 3 years and 1 n1onth deficient. 
1Jnder the law and the facts defendant is entitled to 
judgment of Court quieting his title as to said land 
against plaintiff's pretended clain1 of a private prescrip-
tive right over defendant's '~hon1estead" lands. 
The pre-patent "public high\Yay" theory is as equal-
ly inapplicable to defendanfs ~~ho1nestead'' lands as it 
is to the lands of defendant described in Point I of this 
brief. The legal authorities and argu1nent hereinbefore 
submitted against the adoption of said theory are restated 
and reaffirnted as to defendant ~s ~~ ho1nestead ~, lands. 
l\lanifestly defendant is entitled to judg1nent in this 
lS 
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action denying the existence of a pre-patent "pubic high-
v.ray" over his ''homestead" lands. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS NEVER ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO 
USE THE WATER, WHICH DURING .CERTAIN SEASONS 
OF THE YEAR ACCUMULATES ON DEFENDANT'S LAND 
SITUATE IN SECS. 9 AND 22, TWP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 5 
WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The pertinent findings by the jury relative to this 
phase of the case are found in response to the prepound-
jng of the following interrogatories : 
"11-Do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors in 
ownership used the lands of the defendant in Sec-
tions 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West anrl 
the water holes, if any, upon said lands to water 
his cattle for a period of 20 consecutive years prior 
to May 31, 1955 : Answer: Yes. 
"12-If your answer to No. 11 is yes, answer 
the following question: 
"For how many consecutive years prior to 
l\1ay 31, 1955, has the plaintiff and his prede-
cessors in ownership used said lands and water 
holes ~ Answer : 50 years.'' 
There are no jury findings as to the origin of the water 
nor its quantity, nor the nature and size of the deposit of 
'vater nor whether it was and is produced as a result of 
man or as a natural accumulation, nor as to the frequency 
or infrequency of its accumulation on the said lands. The 
interrogations assumed the existence of water on said 
lands in "water holes." It is therefore necessary to con-
sider the evidence introduced at the trial. There is a 
high degree of conflict in the evidence. The evidence of 
19 
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the defendant denies the presence of water, and the exist-
ence of "water holes" (R. 18, 22). At the most, these are 
]ow places which are "bogs" or mud holes during most 
seasons of the year (R. 23). According to defendant, 
the "bog" or 1nud hole in Sec. 9 was "dynamited" in 1938 
or 1939 and since that time there has been no sign of 
'vater (R. 191). Defendant has never seen plaintiff's 
cattle drink at any "hole" on said section, but rather 
ihey went to adjacent flowing wells to drink (R. 19, 23). 
There were and are no live streams or springs on said 
sections. Examination of said lands was made in 1945 
by witnesses in connection with defendant's "exchange" 
transaction with the United States. These witnesses 
testified in substance that there were no "water holes" 
as the term is ordinarily used nor were there live strearns 
or springs on the land. On one of the sections there "\Yas 
a low place or "bog" but it contained little if any ,,~ater. 
Plaintiff testified "water holes" existed in said sec-
tions and cattle drank from sa1ne ( R. 6-±, 65, 88). The 
water stands in the holes and does not flow out on the 
lands (R. 84). There are four s1nall holes on See. 9 (R. 
83). They hold water the year long-"\Yater fit for eattle 
to drink (R. 85). Cattle have used then1 for years during 
all months of the year. The so ealled '""Tater holes" are 
jn truth but cow tracks \vhich during certain seasons of 
the year fill "\vith \\~ater (R. 86, 88). '':rater does not flow 
off in a channel ( R. 87). Pierre Castagno testified in 
the sunnner of 1952 there \\~as "~ater in the ··hole~, on 
Sec. 9 sufficient to \\~a ter 30 or 40 horses and that in the 
spring of the year there is sufficient water in the "holes" 
to water 20 or 30 head of cattle (R. 255). Tony Castagno 
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testified there are "water holes" on said sections, which 
eontain water during all times of the year and in amount 
sufficient to water cattle. They are never completely 
dried up (R. 295). Rose Castagno stated there are three 
vvater holes on land "north of the old ho1nestead" (R. 
:-304). None of them ever died up and they contained 
"\Vater at all times of drinkable quality (R. 304). Keith 
\Vanless testified there are water holes on said sections 
and water is of such quantity and quality as to be drink-
able (R. 308, 310). Water was in the "holes" in 1956 suf-
ficient to water cattle (R. 310, 311). Twenty-five cows 
could water at those "holes" (R. 317). 
Included in the presentation of the Argument, here-
inafter contained, reference is made to other testimony 
in the case. 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY EN-
ACTMENTS. 
(1) If the water, which durivng certain seasons of 
the year accumul.ates on defendant's lands in Section 9 
and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake B. and 
M. is in the nature of either (a) waste or seepage water, 
or (b) surface water, or (c) percolating water, at no 
time has it been nor is i't now subject to appropriation 
and neither could any rights thereto be acquired by pre-
scripti~on. (56 Am. J ur.-W aters-Sec. 66, Pgs. 548, 549). 
A. Waste Water 
"*** The owner of a water right, after diver-
sion from the stream is the owner and entitled to 
the water itself, the corpus of the water as long as 
he retains it in his ditches and reservoirs on his 
property and under his control ***As long as the 
water is under the control of the appropriator in 
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his land or in his ditches or reservoirs or other 
things owned and controlled by him, it is still his 
water and he may use it in any lawful place or 
for any lawful use he chooses, or may lease and 
sell it. ***" (Srnithfield ·west Bench Irrigation 
Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 
142 Pac. (2nd) 866, 871 ; also 113 Utah 356, 195 
Pac. (2nd) 249.) 
"However in the absence of such a statute it 
is generally held that such waste of water and 
seepage cannot be appropriated * * * The 
plaintiff apparently bases its claim to the exclu-
sive right to the use of this waste water whenever 
it is available upon the fact that it has been using 
such waste water for a long period of time-without 
interruption. However, I do not believe that an 
exclusive right to the use of the waste water can 
be acquired in this manner." (Justice Wolfe in 
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union 
Central Life Ins. Co., supra, and particularly at 
pg. 871 of 149 Pac. (2nd). 
See also: Lasson v. Seeley, 120 lTtah 679, :238 
Pac. (2nd) 418. 
"The question for decision is ''Thether the 
plaintiff has n1ade a valid appropriation of \Yaste 
water as against the defendants, or \Yhether the 
defendants have a right, as against plaintiff, to 
intercept upon their O\Yn land, and before it 
passes therefroin, \Yater "Thich has been spread 
upon the san1e, but not entirely consu1ned, in the 
process of irrigation. It \Yill be observed fron1 
the foregoing state1nent that it is only to such 
\Yater as has actuall~T eseaped fron1 defendants, 
and reached her O\\Tn lands that plaintiff n1akes 
claim. *** It is 1nanifest that, as against the de-
fendants, the plaintiff has not n1ade a valid ap-
propriation of this alleged \Yaste "-rater. Just 
what constitutes "Taste "Tater in every instance 
\ve do not decide, but it is unquestionably true, 
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so far as concerns the right to make a valid ap-
propriation of it, this water is not waste water 
so long as it ren1ains upon the lands of the defend-
ants, and does not, in any event, become such until 
it has escaped and reached the lands of others. 
The plaintiff certainly has acquired no vested 
right to compel the defendants to apply the waters, 
the right to the use of which they own, in such a 
way as that some of it will not soak into their 
own ground, but escape and pass from the surface 
onto her lands.*** So long as, and while, the water 
which is applied by defendants to the irrigation 
of their lands remains upon the same, it is, as 
against the plaintiff, their exclusive property, 
whatever may be the rights of plaintiff as against 
some other claimant to it as waste water." (Burk-
art v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 Pac. 98, 6 LRA 
(NS) 1104.) 
"Defendant's case, both by pleading and evi-
dence, is that these waters did not constitute 
springs or natural water courses, but percolated 
through, and by artificial means had been collect-
ed into bodies or artificial springs on defendant 
Baker's own land, which by artificial surface 
channels flowed into plaintiff's canal, and was, 
with his consent, used by plaintiff only when he 
did not choose to use the same for his own law-
ful purposes, which he often did. * •X< * The trial 
court found, in accordance with the defendants' 
claim, that these waters originally existed as 
percolating waters in defendant Baker's land, and 
by artificial means were developed and collected 
by him into artificial basins in the semblance of 
springs, and as such, therefore, belonged to him, 
as an integral part of his own land, which owner-
ship has never been divested. * * * The law, under 
the facts, makes these waters, arising, as they 
do, on defendant Baker's lands, whether they be 
artificially collected percolating waters or the 
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waters of a natural flowing stream or spring, his 
property, as against the plaintiff in this case, un-
less the latter has acquired them in some way 
known to the law. *** And it is of no consequence 
here whether they are natural springs arising on 
the defendant's lands or have been intercepted 
as percolating waters and artificially collected. 
"The doctrine of appropriation, as under-
stood in the arid states, may or may not, under 
the facts of the case, apply to these waters. That 
we need not decide, for it is clear that, according 
to the findings, the plaintiff has not made a valid. 
appropriation. *** It is also equally clear that 
no right by prescription or adverse use has been 
established, for the findings were that whenever 
defendant Baker wished to use these \Vaters for 
his own domestic purposes, for irrigating lands, 
or for filling fish ponds, or for sale as merchan-
dise, or otherwise, he did so under clain1 of owner-
ship." (Smith Canal and Ditch Co. v. Colorado Ice 
& Storage Co., 34 Colo. 485, 82 Pac. 940, 3 LR_._:i_ 
(N.S.) 1148.) 
"It is probably safer, for the benefit of all, 
and for the sake of stability of water rights, to de-
clare definitely that an appropriation of seepage 
water is void. Of course, if a party has once ob-
tained possession of such "\Yater, and another party 
not entitled thereto should atte1npt to deprive him 
thereof, the possessor "\Yould doubtless have a 
cause of action. Wiel, supra, Sec. 55. But that 
is not the situation here. The intervener "~anted 
to get possession, and sues because Binning pre-
vented hi1n frou1 getting it." (Binning 1'. ill-iller, 
88. Wyo. -tf>1 ; 102 Pac. (2nd) 5-l-. at pg. G~). 
4
• Likewise, in I~inney on Irrigation, 2nd Ed., 
volun1e 2, page 1151, Section 661. is the follo,Ying: 
'Authorities hold that "\vhile the "\Vater, 
so deno1uinated as "\vaste "\Vater, 1nay be used 
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after it escapes, no permanent right can be 
acquired to have the discharge kept up, either 
by appropriation, or a right by prescription, 
estoppel, or acquiescence in its use while it is 
escaping, and that, too, even though expen-
sive ditches or works were constructed for 
the purpose of utilizing such waste water, 
unless some other element enters into the 
condition of affairs, other than the mere use 
of the water. In other words, the original ap-
propriators have the right, and in fact it is 
their duty to prevent, as far as possible, all 
waste of the water which they have appro-
priated, in order that the others 'vho are en-
titled thereto may receive the benefit thereof.' 
Also, section 662, at page 1153 : 
'After water has been appropriated and 
diverted from a natural stream into ditches, 
canals, or other artificial works, it becomes 
personal property and cannot be appropri-
ated from such works.' 
"There is no obligation upon an owner to con-
tinue to maintain conditions so as to supply water 
to appropriators of waste water at any time or 
in any quantity when acting in good faith." 
(Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard 
City, 131 Colo. 177, 280 Pac. (2nd) 426, 428.) 
"Neither the rule of reasonable use nor the 
rule of correlative rights has any application to 
percolating water which is the result of the land-
owner irrigating his land. The rules are limited 
in their application to such water as percolate8 
through the soil from natural causes. If a land-
owner conveys water onto his premises by artifi-
cial irrigation and thereby causes water to perco-
late through his land and into adjoining land, the 
owner of the adjoining land does not acquire a 
vested right to have the water continue to so 
percolate through his land. A landowner may 
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irrigate or fail to irrigate his land, and, although 
by irrigation a benefit is conferred upon an ad-
joining landowner, such benefit may be withheld 
at pleasure. Percolating water resulting from the 
irrigation of one's own land may be recovered 
and used by the owner before it leaves his land 
without invading any right of an adjoining land-
owner." (Petersen v. Cache County Drai·nage Dis-
trict, 77 Utah 256, 294 Pac. 289, 291.) 
"It is sufficient to here state, without approv-
ing or disapproving the doctrine of the reasonable 
use rule, that the facts as found by the court do 
not bring the case within that rule. The seepage 
or percolating water here involved is created by 
the artificial irrigation of appellant's land. True, 
as a result of this irrigation, the \Yater sinks, 
seeps, and percolates into the soil of appellant'~ 
land and saturates it for a depth of several feet; 
it, nevertheless, is nothing more in- fact and in 
law than surface or waste \Yater. *** The la\v 
is well settled, in fact the authorities all agree, 
that one landowner receiving \Yaste \Yater -which 
flows, seeps, or percolates from the land of an-
other cannot acquire a prescriptive right to such 
water, nor any right (except by grant) to have 
the owner of the land fron1 which he obtains the 
water continue the flo\v. The general rule regard-
ing the right of the owner of land to surface \Yater 
therein is stated by ~Ir. Farnha1n, in his \York on 
Water Rights (page 2572), as follo\vs: ~There is 
no right on the part of a lo\ver appropriator to 
have surface water flo\v to his land fro1n upper 
property. The owner of the soil on \Yhich it falls 
has an absolute right to it, and 1nay do "~th it 
what he pleases. And the fact that surface \Vater 
has flowed from the land of one n1an onto that 
of another for 1nore than 20 years ''Till not prevent 
the for1ner fro1n draining his land so as to cut of-f 
the flow.' 
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"In 1 Wiel on Water Rights (3d Ed.) p. 50, 
the author says : 'While artificial flow claimants 
1nay thus have priorities between themselves, they 
can have no right of continuance against the own-
er of the natural supply (the appropriator on the 
natural stream ***), except by grant, condemna-
tion, or dedication (or by rule of compulsory ser-
vice where the water is distributed to public use). 
The chief instance of artificial flows in practice 
is where some stream owner has carried 'vater 
to a distance and, after use, discharges it belo\v 
his land or works. *** Seeing the water con1e 
down, other parties arrive, build ditches belovv, 
receive the water, and put it to use. Yet unless 
they have a contract with the stream owner, they 
must generally rely upon continued receipt from 
him of such water at their peril. In such case the 
creator of this artificial flovv may cease to allo'v 
it to escape.' And on page 52 it is said: "In the 
absence of contract, the natural water-right ovvner 
may cease the abandonment of waste fro1n a ditch, 
and so use the water that none of it thereafter 
runs waste, or so that it runs off in a new place 
where people below no longer can get it. Long 
receipt by them of the water of itself gives no 
permanent right to have the discharge continued, 
whether by appropriation, prescription, or es-
toppel, even though the lower claimants built ex-
pensive ditches or flumes to catch the waste.' 
Numerous decisions are cited by the author in a 
note to the text which illustrate and support this 
doctrine. And again on page 54 it is said: 'Waste 
water soaking from the land of another after irri-
gation need not be continued, and may be inter-
cepted and taken by such original irrigator, and 
conducted elsewhere, though parties theretofore 
using the waste are deprived thereof.' ( Garn v. 
Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867, 871, 872.) 
"It is a rule long recognized that a 'landowner 
cannot acquire a prescriptive right to the con-
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tinued flow of waste or seepage water from the 
land of another, that is, seepage water or waste 
water running from one's land to that of another 
need not be continued and it may be intercepted 
and taken by such owner at any time and used on 
the land to which it is appurtenant. 
'No valid appropriation can be made or 
prescriptive right acquired by gathering sur-
plus water as it flows over the surface fron1 
adjoining property upon which it has been 
spread for irrigation purposes, or by merely 
accepting and using water when it is allowed 
to flow into one's ditch by the original owner, 
who makes exclusive use of it whenever he 
chooses to do so.' 30 Am. Jur. 611, Sec. 19. 
"The original appropriator may at any tune 
recapture waste water remaining on his land and 
apply it to a beneficial use. Barker v. Sonner, 135 
Or. 75, 294 P. 1053; Sebern v. l\Ioore, -±-!Idaho -±10, 
258 P. 176; Reynolds Irrigation Co. v. Sproat 
70 Idaho 217, 214 P. 2d 880. 
"Hence, as against the original appropriator 
and owner, an adjoining land O\\Tier cannot ac-
quire a prescriptive right to \Yaste or seepage 
water." (Thompson t\ Biughanz, 78 Idaho 305, 302 
Pac. (2nd) 9-+8, 949. 
"We think the evidence both for appellants 
and respondent tends to sho\Y that the \Vaters in 
dispute are seepage and pereolating \Yatel's. These 
waters rose in such quantities on respondent'=' 
land that it beean1e subn1erged and \Yas rendered 
unfit for the raising of hay and other fa.rn1 prod-
ucts. The respondent undoubted!~~ had a right to 
drain his land of the \Yater and put it in a eondi-
tion for raising crops. 'Vhether he did this by 
sinking \YPlls or by digging drain ditehes \Yas 
of no eoncern to appellants. The \Yater thus de-
~8 
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veloped or collected being waste water which seeps 
and percolates into respondent's land from adjoin-
ing lands, he had the legal right to make what-
ever beneficial use of it he deemed proper, and he 
did not invade any right of appellant's by so doing. 
We think the right to the use of the water in this 
case comes squarely within the rule announced in 
the case of Garns v. Rollins, 125 Pac. 867, recently 
decided by this court." (Roberts v. Gribble, 43 
Utah 411, 134 Pac. 1014, 1016.) 
B. Surface Water 
"The terin 'surface water'·is used in the la\v 
of waters in reference to a distinct form or class 
of water which is generally defined as that which 
is derived from falling rain or melting snow, or 
which rises to the surface in springs, and is dif-
fused over the surface of the ground while it re-
mains in such diffused state or condition. It is 
thus distinguished from water flowing in a natural 
water course or collected into and forming a defi-
nite and identifiable body, such as a lake or pond. 
In some instances the courts have classed as sur-
face waters such as lie or spread over the surface, 
or percolate the soil, as in swamps and do not flow 
in any particular direction." (56 Am. Jur. -
Waters-Sec. 65, pgs 547, 548.) 
" (Surface) waters, in a legal sense are those 
which fall on the land, by precipitation from the 
skies, or arise in springs and spread over the sur-
face of the ground without being collected into a 
definite body. McDaniel v. Cummings, 83 Cal. 
515; 8 L.R.A. 575, 23 Pac. 795; 3 Farnham Waters, 
Sec. 278." (San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. 
Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 Pac. 554, 
9 A.L.R. 1200.) 
"Surface waters are those which are produced 
by rain fall, melting snow, or springs, and which 
in cases of the two first mentioned sources are 
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precipitated, and in the case of the last mentioned 
source rise upon the land*** Such waters are not 
divested of their character as surface waters by 
reason of their flowing from the land on which 
they first make their appearance on to lo"\ver land 
in obedience to the law of gravity." (Le Brun v. 
Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825, 72 A.L.R. 
336.) 
"The term 'surface water' includes such as is 
carried off by surface drainage-this is drainage 
independently of a water course." (Snyder v. Platt 
Valley, etc. Irrig. Co., 144 Neb. 308, 12 N.W. (2d) 
160, 160 A.L.R. 1164.) 
"*** the weight of authority is to the effect 
that the right to flow of surface water from an ad-
joining tract cannot be acquired by prescription." 
(56 Am. Jur. Waters, Sec. 66, pg. 549.) 
"From the facts here it is clear that we are 
not concerned \vith the rules which pertain to 
surface waters in the con1monly accepted n1ean-
ing of that term in adjudications of this type. 
That term as so used means \Vater diffused over 
the surface of the ground and derived generally 
from falling rains or n1elting sno\v, and it con-
tinues to be such until it reaches \vell defined 
channels wherein it custo1narily flo\vs at \Yhich 
time it becomes part of a streanL Once part of a 
stream, it does not again beeo1ne surface "Tater 
simply beeause it overflo\\Ts the banks. \\~ ater 
whieh eontinues to flo"T in the sa1ne direetion even 
though outside the banks, and \Yhieh returns to the 
ehannel upon the subsidence of the flood is part 
of a running strean1 and it loses its character as 
sueh only" \Yhen it 8preads out oYer the open eoun-
try, settles in lakes or pools, or finds so1ne other 
outlet." (11/rf{ell l'. Sj)(lJlish Fork~. 6 lTtah (:2nd) 
92, 305 Pae. (2nd) 1097.) 
C. Percolat,ing TT' aters 
''The \Yaters issuing fron1 the artificial tunnel 
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into the lake are found to be underground, perco-
lating waters from the mining claim of the defend-
ant, and not vvaters naturally flo\ving in a stream 
with a well-defined channel, banks, and course. 
Under such a state of facts, the law seems to be 
well settled that water percolating through the 
soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished from the 
soil itseli. The owner of the soil is entitled to 
the waters percolating through it, and such \Vater 
is not subject to appropriation. The ordinary 
rules of law applying to the appropriation of 
surface streams do not apply to percolating \\Tater 
and subterranean streams, with undefined and 
unknown courses and banks. When \\Tater per eo-
lates through and under the surface of the earth 
upon land belonging to one person, and comes 
to the surface just before it empties itself upon 
the land of another, the owner of such land has 
no right to de1nand that such percolation shall 
continue. ***. 
"It is clear that, vrior to the ti1ne \vhen the 
tunnel vvas dug upon the Inining claim of the de-
fendant, the water was percolating \Vater, flowing, 
seeping, or circulating in minute particles beneath 
the surface thereof, without banks or defined chan-
nels, and that its course was invisible and un-
known. By the construction of this tunnel, this 
percolating water has beco1ne an artificial strea1n, 
and has never been diverted fron1 the defendant'3 
land, nor its waters taken away from the defend-
ant or its grantors. {Tnder such circu1nstances, 
when percolating vvaters have been gathered into 
tunnels or ditches, and allowed to flo\v from the 
proprietor's land to the inferior proprietor, and 
have been used by him a greater period of ti1ne 
than that allowed by the statute of limitations, it 
has been held that no title by prescription ha8 
been gained." (Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver J(?.Jlfl 
Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244, 245, 247.) 
:~1 
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"\\! ... hen the United States issued it patent to 
the respondent, neither the bog nor 1narsh, nor 
the water in question, was visible upon the land 
conveyed. Nor was there any known and defined 
subterranean stream thereon. At that time the 
water, if it existed at all, was percolating through 
the· soil, or flowing· in a subterranean stream, 
having no defined or known channels, courses, or 
banks. Water so percolating and flo\ving forn1s :1 
part of the realty, and belongs to the owner of 
the soil. A conveyance or grant by the United 
States of any part of the public domain to a per-
son, natural or artificial, carries \vith it the right 
of filtrating or percolating water, and to streams 
flowing through the soil beneath the surface, but 
in undefined and unknown channels, just the same 
as it carries with it the right to rocks and minerals 
jn the ground which have not been reserved in the 
instrument of conveyance or by statute. Water, 
intermingling vvith the ground or flowing through 
it by filtration or percolation or by chemical at-
traction, is but a component part of the earth, and 
has no characteristics of ownership distinct from 
the land itself. In the eye of the law, water so com-
mingled and flowing, or motionless, underneath 
the surface, is not the subject of ownership apart 
and distinct from the soil. If, however, subsur-
face streams of water flow in clearly-defined 
channels, it is otherwise, for then the rules of 
law applicable to surface strean1s and waters 
apply·." (Willow Creek Irrigation Co. v. Michael-
son, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 9-b3.) 
( 2) At all tinles since 111 ay 11, 1903, the only 1neth od 
by which plaintiff could have acquired the right to 1Jse 
the waters which accunMtlates ou defendant's lands in 
Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South_, Range 5 West, Salt 
Lake Base and 11! eridian, was by forrnal appropriation 
of same as prescribed by the statutes of the State of [Tta.h. 
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'1'he · acqttisition of rights to use water in Utah by pres-
cription has been prohibited since said date. 
A. Constitu,tional and Statutory Enactments 
HAll existing rights to the use of any waters 
in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, 
are hereby recognized and confirmed." ( Constitu-
tion of State of Utah, ART. XVII, Sec. 1.) 
"'All \\Taters in this state, whether above or 
under the ground are hereby declared to be the 
property of the public, subject to all existing 
rights to the use thereof." (La,vs of Utah 1919, 
Chap. 67, Sec. 1; R.S. 1933, Sec. 100-1-1; Laws of 
utah 1935, 8hap. 105, Sec. 1; Utah Code Ann. 
1943, Sec. 100-1-1; litah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 73-
1-1.) 
The Fifth Regular Session of the Legislature of the 
State of Utah, convened in February and l\1arch, 1903, 
adopted a Water Code \vhich repealed all prior laws on 
the subject of vv"" ater Rights and Irrigation. (La\VS of 
Utah, 1903, Chap. 100, pg. 88). Section 3-! of this enact-
ment reads as follows : 
"Rights to the use of any of the [tnappropri-· 
ated water iu the State 1nay be acquired by ap-
propriation, in the 1nanner hereinafter provided, 
and not otherwise. The appropriation must be 
for some useful or beneficial purpose, and, as 
between appropriators, the one first in time should 
be first in right." (Italics supplied.) 
rrhis new Water Code was approved by the 9-overnor 
on March 12, 1903, and became effective sixty days after 
March 12, 1903 (date of sine die adjournment of the 
Legislature), or on May 11, 1903. 
The Sixth Regular Session of the Legislature of the 
State of Utah convened in :B'ebruary and March, 1905, 
repealed Chapter 100 of the Laws of Utah 1903 (La\vs of 
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Utah 1905, Chap. 108, pg 145 ), and enacted another Water 
Code. However, the 1905 Code continued, Sec. 34 of the 
1903 Code, in exact form as above set forth. (It con-
tinued to bear the number of Section 34.) The 1905 Code 
specifically provided, according to Constitutional man-
date, that it should become effective on approval. The 
(fovernor approved the Code March 9, 1905, and said date 
\Vas therefore the effective date of the 1905 Code. 
When Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 were prepared, 
the Water Code of 1905 became Chapter 2 of Title 40 of 
said Compiled Laws and Sec. 3-! of the Water Code of 
1903 and 1905 were perpetuated in exact form and phrase-
ology as first above quoted as Sec. 1288X5 Compiled Laws 
of Utah 1907. 
The Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature of the 
State of Utah, convened January-February and March, 
1911, amended Sec. 1288X5 (Compiled La\YS of Utah 
1907, Chap. 103, Laws of Utah 1911, pg. 1-±3) to read as 
follows: 
"Rights to the ruse of the unappropriated 
water in the State may be acquired by appropria-
tion in the 1nanner hereinafter prol·ided, and not 
otherwise. The appropriation n1ust be for son1e 
useful and. beneficial purpose, and, as between 
appropriators, the one first in ti1ne shall be first 
in right; (procided that, when a use designated in 
an application to appropriate any of the unappro-
priated 1caters of the State zcould nlaterially inter-
fere with a n1ore beneficial use of such zrater. then 
the appropriation shall be dealt with as provided 
in Section 1288Xl8). (Italics supplied.) 
The Governor approved this Act on ~{arch 20, 1911. 
The Legislative session adjourned l\Iarch 9, 1911. The 
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Act, therefore became effective May 10, 1911. 
vVhen Compiled Laws of 1917 were prepared, Sec. 
1288X5, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, as amended by 
Chapter 103, Laws of Utah, 1911, last above quoted, be-
eame Sec. 3450, Co1np. Laws of Utah 1917, and was a 
part of Title 55, Chap. 3 . 
•. 
The Thirteenth Regular Session of the Legislature 
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1919, 
by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919 (pg. 177) repealed 
the Water Code as it appeared in Title 55, Chapters 1, 
2and 3, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, and enacted an 
entirely new Water Code. However, Sec. 41 of this enact-
ment repeated verbatim Sec. 3450, Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1917. Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919, was approved 
11arch 13, 1919, and since it carried an e1nergency clause 
it became effective on said date. 
Title 100, Chap. 3, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, 
set forth verbatim Sec. 41, Laws of Utah 1919 (which 
in its amended form was Sec. 3450, Comp. Laws of Utah 
1.917). In the R.S. of Utah 1933 the pertinent section 
\Vas designated Sec. 100-3-1 of the R.S. 
The t\venty-first Regular Session of the Legislature 
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1935, 
amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, to read as fol-
lows: 
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated pub-
lic waters in this state may be acquired only as 
provided in this title. No appro ]Jriation of UJatc r 
may be made and no rights to the use thereof 
initiated and no notice of i'ntent to appropriate 
shall be recognized except appli(·ation for such 
appropriation first be Inade to the State Engineer 
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in the manner hereinafter provided, and not other-
wise. The appropriation must be for some useful 
and beneficial purpose and as between appro-
priators, the one fir:st in time shall be first in 
• 
right; provided that when a use designated by an 
application to appropriate any of the unappro-
priated waters of the State would materially 
interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, 
the application shall be dealt with as provided in 
Section 100-3-8." (Italics supplied.) (La\vs of 
Utah, 1935, Chap. 105, pg. 195-196.) 
The T\venty-third Regular Session of the Legisla-
ture of Utah, convened January, February and March 
1939, amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, as amend-
ed by Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 105, quoted 
in full above, by repeating same in exact language as 
above set forth and then adding: 
"No right to the use of water either appro-
priated or unappropriated can be acquired by ad-
verse use or adverse possession." 
This amended statute of 1939 carried an en1ergency 
clause and thereby became effective on approval, ,,~hich 
\\~as March 20, 1939. 
Utah Code Ann. 1943, repeats the 1939 reenactn1ent 
and amendment in exact form as above given, as Sec. 
100-3-1. Likewise Utah Code Ann. 1953 repeats the 1939 
enactment and an1endment as Sec. 73-3-1, and brings the 
provision to date. 
B. Judicial Decisions 
"The question is therefore clearly presented 
whether the actual diversion of ·w .. ater prior to 
Inaking an application to the state engineer gives 
to the party- 1naking the diversion a right superior 
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to another who first files his application in the 
state engineer's office. 
"Chapter 67. Laws of Utah 1919, relates to 
water and water rights. The act is designated as 
"An act defining general provisions concerning 
water and water rights, the appropriation, admin-
istration,' etc., and amends some prior laws. Sec-
tion 41 of that chapter, so far as material here, 
provides: 
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated 
public water in the state may be acquired 
by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter 
provided, and not other,vise." 
""The section further provides that tne it v-
propriation n1ust be for a beneficial purpose, and 
that as between two appropriators the one first in 
time shall be first in right. *** The first Utah 
legislative act, so far as I have been able to as--
certain, respecting the method or mode of appro-
priating water, was passed by the Legislature of 
1897 (La-\YS 1F597, c. 52).*** By the act of 1897 any 
person desiring thereafter to appropriate water 
was required to post notices in 'vriting in t\vo 
conspicuous places, one at the post office nearest 
the point of intended diversion, and the other at 
the point of intended diversion. *** Apparently 
no other or further legislation was enacted re-
specting the appropriation of \Yater until 1903. 
(Laws 1903 c. 100). The Legislature 1n that year 
incorporated in the act relating to water rights 
and irrigation section 41 as the same appears in 
chapter 67. Laws Utah 1919. Numerous an1end-
Inents were n1ade to the irrigation la\vs of thi~ 
state by the Legislatures Ineeting since 1903, but 
in none of such legislation has the method or man-
ner of appropriating water as prescribed by the 
Legislature of 1903 been changed or modified. *** 
If our statute did not contain the words 'and not 
otherwise,' then the decisions of the appellate 
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courts of Idaho and Wyoming ought to and would 
have much weight in a determination of the ques-
tion now under consideration. It is a matter of 
common knowledge in this state that many contro-
versies arose between claimants and much litiga-
tion resulted prior to our legislative act of 1903 
respecting the dates of the appropriation by dif-
ferent claimants of the waters of the state. Very 
much of that litigation had to do exclusively with 
the dates of the appropriations. The rule or prin-
ciple of law that he who \Yas first in time \vas 
first in right had become permanently established 
in the jurisprudence of the state. The fact as to 
who was a prior appropriator was in much, if not 
all, of the litigation a controverted question, and 
one which in many cases was most difficult to 
determine by reason of there being no public rec-
ord of just when such appropriations \\~ere made. 
It is therefore not only reasonable and fair to con-
clude, but affords a strong argument to support 
the claim, that the language found in the act of 
1903 -was intended to mean and does n1ean that the 
only method to be recognized thereafter "~as the 
method therein prescribed. *** \Y. e are of the 
opinion, and so hold, that the Legislature of Utah, 
by the act of 1903, intended to linrit the n1ethod of 
acquiring any rights to the unappropriated public 
waters of the state to the method or means pre-
scribed in that act. The rights attempted to be 
acquired by respondent Hooppiania by actually 
diverting the \Yater and applying the san1e to a 
beneficial use n1ust therefore be held to be subject 
to the right of appellant "~ho "~ill acquire the first 
right hy con1pleting its appropriation initiated by 
its application filed in the state engineer's office 
on April 25, 191S. '' (Deserc:t Lire Stock Co. c. 
H . 66 Ut I ·).- ·)•")() p 1-9 10·) 10q) oopp1aua. a1 ..... (_). --~)._ ac. -rl • -±0-. -r0~•. 
''I eonenr in the opinion of 1\Ir. Chief Justice 
Gideon that Chopter 67, Sess. La,Ys of lTtah 1919, 
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provides an exclusive 1nethod for the appropria-
tion of public ''Tater in the state of Utah. The very 
language and purpose of the act, when construed 
in connection \vith the acts vvhich it superseded 
and repealed, demonstrates conclusively that the 
purpose was to vrovide an exclusive method of 
appropriating \Yater and securing a record title 
thereto. * * * The method presented for appropri-
ating vvater com1nences with chapter 100, Sess. 
Laws 1903, § 34, which section furnishes the key 
for interpreting all that follo\\TS do\\Tn to and 
including section 46. Section 34 reads as follo\vs: 
'Rights to the use of any of the unappro-
priated water in the state 1nay be acquired 
by appropriation, in the 1nanner hereinafter 
provided, and not otherwise. The appropria-
tion must be for some useful or beneficial 
purpose, and, as between appropriators, the 
one first in time shall be first in right.' 
* :::· * The history of the legislation upon this 
subject, as above set forth, discloses the fact that 
the statute involv5ng the question now before 
the court has been under review at eight differ-
ent sessions of the Utah Legislature. The la\\T, 
as originally enacted in 1903, has been amended 
and changed in divers respects, immaterial as 
far as the question here is concerned, but the 
manifestly exclusive features of the 1nethod of 
procedure to rn·ocure title have never been 
ehanged. * * * If plain, emphatic, unequivocal 
language is not sufficient to express the intention 
of the Legislature, in \vhat n1anner and h)· \\'hat 
1neans can the 1--Aegislature express its intention~ 
If there \\"ere a single line, \Yord, or thought any-
where in the act inconsistent or in conflict "·ith 
the express declaration of the LPfdslature at tlte 
very starting point of the method of procedure 
Inapped out by the Legislature, I \Yould eoncur 
in the suggestion that we should resort to rules 
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of construction in order to determine the inten-
tion of the statute; but the truth is the statute 
is so plain frorn he beginning to the end of the 
whole course of procedure that there is no occa-
sion for resorting to rules of construction. * * * 
Before concluding this opinion I feel impelled 
to say that this statute has been in force for a 
period of 22 years. Hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of the public money have_ been expended 
in maintaining suitable offices and parapi1ernalia 
for carrying out the purposes of the act, to say 
nothing about the amounts paid in saiaries to 
the state engineer and his deputies, assistants, 
and clerks. It cannot be denied that a system 
whereby a complete record is required of rights 
and titles to the use of water is infinitely super-
ior to a system, if it can be called a systen1, 
in which the evidence of title rests entirely in 
parol and depends solely upon the men1ory of 
man. It may be contended that this goes to the 
policy of the act which belongs exclusively to the 
Legislature, and is therefore outside the domain 
of judicial interpretation. We contend, however, 
that if the policy of the act is manifestly wise 
and superior to previous systen1s fron1 the stand-
point of policy, it is one of the most cogent 
reasons why we should hold that the Legislature 
n1ust have intended exactly '"hat it said and has 
repeated and reiterated time after time for al-
most a quarter of a century." (Concurring opinion 
of Mr. Justice Thurman in Deseret Lirestock Co. 
vs. Hooppiania, supra) 
"But respondents argue that all these cases, 
except the one last cited, "~ere either tried or 
were based upon rights claimed to have been 
acquired prior to the enaet1nent of the la"\Y of 
appropriation of "\Yater through the office of the 
state engin~er, and (1) since the enact1nent of 
that statute, 'vater rights can only be acquired 
-±0 
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by appropriation through the office of the state 
engineer and can only be lost by abandonment, 
and when abandoned it reverts to the state; and 
(2) if water can be acquired by adverse user and 
possession since the enactment of the appropria-
tion laws, it cannot be so done after adjudication 
of the rights, and in defiance of the terms of the 
adjudication decree. The answer to the first prop-
osition is found within the terms of the statute, 
relative to appropriation. Sections 100-3-1 and 
100-3-2, R.S. 1933, read: 
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated 
public waters in this state Inay be acquired 
by appropriation in the manner hereinafter 
provided, and not otherwise.' Section 100-3-1. 
'Any person who is a citizen * * * in 
order hereafter to acquire the right to the 
use of any unappropriated public \Yater in 
this state shall before co1nmencing the con-
struction * * * n1ake an application in writ-
ing to the state engineer.' Section 100-3-2. 
It is clear fron1 the language that the sections 
above quoted apply only to acquiring rights in 
the unappropriated public water, and have no 
reference to \Vater rights vvhich have passed to 
private o\vnership until they have been abandoned 
and thereby reverted to the public. How may 
water rights under the statute be lost~ Section 
3468, Comp. La\vs 1917, in force during the times 
involved in this action, reads : 
'vVhen the appropriator or his successor 
in interest abandons or ceases to use water 
for a period of seven years, the right ceases, 
and thereupon such water reve1'ts to the 
public, and Inay again be appropriated, as pro-
vided in this title; but questions of abandonnJent 
shall be questions of fact, and shall be de-
termined as are other questions of fact.' 
Construing this section, this court in Deseret 
-1:1 
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Live Stock Co. v. llooppiania, 66 Utah, 25, 239 
P. 479, 481, said: 
'By express language of the foregoing 
statute there are two methods or means b~T 
which one entitled to the use of waters in 
the state may lose such right: (1) by aban-
donment; and (2) by ceasing to use the san1e 
for a period of seven years.' " 
(Han~n~ond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. (2nd) 
894, 899; also 94 Utah 35, 75 Pac. (2nd) 164) 
"Under our laws, rights in and to the use 
of public waters, or of a natural stream or source, 
may be acquired only by appropriation and by 
an actual diversion of waters from the natural 
channel or stream and a beneficial use made of 
them and as by our statutes provided. Neither 
the defendants nor their predecessors made any 
diversion of the waters of the creek for \Yatering 
live stock or for any other purpose. They, without 
any diversion, merely permitted animals to drink 
directly from the creek. That gave then1 no right 
to or possession of the use of the waters, for as 
said by the author, ~ Kinney on Irrigation and 
Water Rights, 1242 that as 'no possession or 
exclusive property (of \Yater) can be acquired 
while it is still flo,ving and ren1aining in its 
natural channel or strean1, it follo\vs~ therefore, 
that in order to obtain possession of the \Yater 
atte1npted to be appropriated, it is an indispens-
able requisite that there n1ust be an actual diver-
sion of the \Vater fro1n its natural channel into 
the appropriator\~ ditrh~ canaL reserYoir~ or other 
strnetnre.' Case~ are there cited in support of 
tlH• text.~' (Bountiful C'ity r. De Luca, 77 l~tah 
107, 118 ~ ~9:2 l)ae. 19±~ 199: ·7:2 A.L.R,. 657) 
"If t hi~ be nt>\v or added \Vater, no right 
thereto ean attach or be asserted until after an 
applieation has been filed in the office of the 
-l-~ 
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state engineer. Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Ii oop-
}Jiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479; Bountiful City v. 
De Luca, 77 1Ttah 107, 292 P. 194, 72 A.L.R. 657. 
If it be considered as 1nerely a ehange in place 
of diversion, it also n1ust start \vith an application 
in the office of the state engineer, and notiee 
must be given so interested parties could be heard 
and their rights protected. Appellants pleaded in 
their ans\\'er, and testified, that the proposed 
\Vorks -vvould save fron1 evaporation and seepage 
a considerable quantity of water and the Co1npan~r 
would per1nit the Tcnvn to divert into its pipe 
line a part thereof in consideration of the Town 
doing the work and furnishing the 1none~r to 
effect the savings. No application ,,·as n1ade to 
the state engineer either to appropriate this \Vater 
or to change the point of diversion of their \\·ater. 
It is admitted that defendants' works would in-
close the entire stream no\\r flo\\Ting in its natural 
channel, thus excluding everyone (the public) 
from enjoyn1ent of all rights therein. vVhen a 
person seeks to do this, he has the burden of 
showing his right so to do, and this burden appel-
lants did not carry." (Adants v. To1rn of Portage, 
95 {Ttah 1, 72 Pac. ((2nd) G48, 654 
"What we did say \vas that the records (the 
pleadings of appellant and the evidence) show the 
waters in dispute, froin -vvhich appellant sought to 
exclude respondents and the public generally, 
-vvere waters which appellants had not appropri-
ated, either by user before enactment of the stat-
utory method, chapter 100, Laws Utah, 1903, now 
Rev. St. 1933, 100-3-1 et seq., or by application 
in the office of the engineer since such 1nethod 
\vas prescribed. The trial court so found, and \\·c 
upheld that finding. Thus, holding that appellants 
had never had any rights to the waters used by 
respondents, the ( {Uestion of adverse user sine-2 
1903 is in nowise determinative of the cause.~, 
+:~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Adarns v. Town of Portage, 95 Utah 20, 81 Pac. 
(2nd) 368 on rehearing) 
"In the light of this evidence we proceed to 
consider the defenses urged. First, as to the de-
fense of valid appropriation. We conclude that 
if these defendants had made a valid appropri-
ation prior to the l{i1nball Decree, all rights se-
cured thereunder would have been lost by the 
entry of that Decree which awarded them no 
water. Since the entry of the Kimball Decree in 
1922, in fact since 1903, the method for appropri-
ation of unappropriated water has been prescribed 
by statute and we have consistently held that 
this statutory procedure for appropriating "\Yater 
is exclusive. Hammond v. Johnson, supra; Adams 
v. Portage Irr. Reservoir, & Power Co., supra: 
Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, supra; 
Bountiful City v. De L1lca, · 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 
194; 72 A.L.R. 657. Although this statutory pro-
cedure has been amended at various times (see 
Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 111, La,Ys 
of Utah 1939) at all times since 1903 the statutory 
procedure has required a filing of an application 
with the State Engineer. The evidence fails to 
show that this procedure was followed by these 
defendants and their defense of valid appropria-
tion must fail." (Wells ville East Field I rr. Co. t·. 
Lindsay Land ~~ L. Co., 104 Utah ±48, 137 Pac. 
(2nd) 634, 644) 
3. ARGUMENT 
(A) The waters on defendants' land in Sec. 9 
and 22 trere not and are not subject to ap-
propriation or prescriptive ,user. 
The findings of the jury do not disclose the nature, 
source, origin, kind or quantity of " ... ater " ... ~ch plaintiff 
and his witnesses assert exist and has existed upon 
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defendant's lands in Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 S., Range 
3 West, Salt Lake Base and ~Ieridian. The responses 
by the jury to the interrogatories propounded to it 
by the Court simply indicate the time element involved 
in plaintiff's alleged use of the waters based on an 
assumption that water in some a1nount existed on Sees. 
9 and 22, during the duration of use. It is therefore 
necessary to examine and consider the relevant evidence 
in order to determine the necessary facts with respect 
to said water. 
Insofar as the defendant's evidence is concerned, 
it denies the existence of water and "water holes" on 
said lands (R. 136) and presents proof that at the most 
there existed during certain seasons of certain years only 
Hbogs" or "mud holes" located in certain sn1all restricted 
areas (R. 177, 178, 179, 186). They were occasioned by 
precipitation primarily and flow of melting snows and 
probably by a small amount of percolating water in de-
fendant's land which came to the surface and then gravi-
tted to low places on said land (R. 137). The source of 
this small amount of moisture is not directly disclosed 
by the evidence. Defendant's evidence was corroborated 
by that of the witnesses, Aldous, Palmer and Price, who 
testified that there was a "bog" on Sec. 9, but no water 
holes (R. 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 241, 242). 
Plaintiff's evidence in the main contradicts that of 
of the defendant. Plaintiff and his witnesses testified as 
to water and "water holes" but never mentioned the 
source of the water. It is interesting to note that plain-
tiff's evidence during the course of trial became progres-
sively more "moist" and "wetter." Cornmencing with 
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plaintiff's own testimony in his case in chief-"11he whole 
place is not covered with water. There are holes ''Tatered. 
Did you ever see a cow make a track * * *j' (R. 86). 
"There is not enough water to flow away" (R. 87). (Plain-
tiff testified there existed a water hole in SE 1~ Sec. 9 
Sec. 22) (R. 63, 64, 83, 84). He marked these alleged 
holes on the map P Ex. 1 (R. 64). When plaintiff testified 
on rebuttal, the one water hole in Sec. 9 became (R. 83) 
fouT holes (R. 279) and they contained water during all 
ruonths of the year and they always contained water 
that cattle could and do use (R. 279, 280). Pierre Cas-
tagno produced sufficient water in these "holes" to 
'vater 30 or 40 horses (R. 255). Tony Castagno asserted 
that the "holes" never dried up and contained water 
during all years at all times in sufficient amount to 
\Vater cattle (R. 295). Rose Castagno asserted that the 
'~holes" never dried up and there was water in them at 
all times of drinkable quality (R. 304). Keith Wanless 
called the water accumulations "spring holes" (R. 309). 
lle said they contained "spring \Yater" not "run off" 
\Vater (R. 316) but did not identify the source of the 
w·ater. Cattle drank at the so-called ''holes" (R. 310). 
The conflict in the evidence as to \Yhether \Yater 
existed on the defendant's lands \Yas not resolved by 
the jury. It ren1ains a question of fact for the fact 
finder. If no water is found to exist then of course the 
rlefendant is entitled to judg1nent on this issue. Ho\v-
ever, defendant believes it expedient to present his argu-
rnent on the assu1nption (and this is an assmnption in 
favor of plaintiff and is 1nade for purposes of argu-
ment only) that sonle l ... ~i,nd of \Yater and of son1e (but 
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unknown amount has existed on Sees. 9 and 22 aforesaid. 
Plaintiff's evidence identifies this water as either 
(a) waste or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or 
(c) percolating water. It is certainly not water flowing 
in an established course. It is not water in a pond. It is 
not water flowing directly from a spring. It is not 
"live" water. It is not "natural" water. It possesses 
certain elements of "surface" water and certain elements 
of percolating water. Interpreting the evidence in a light 
1nost favorable to plaintiff, the water appears to be 
"dead" water representing moisture which has accum-
ulated in low places on defendant's land during certain 
periods of the year depending upon amount of natural 
precipitation and seepage fron1 other areas. 
The vvater thus identified and described by plaintiff 
and his witnesses is exactly the type and kind of water 
that is not and never has been subject either to formal 
appropriation under the water laws nor subject to be 
acquired by prescriptive user. The authorities cited above 
from Utah and neighboring states without contradiction 
declare this principle. Quoted authorities on irrigation 
and water law, after defining waste or seepage water, 
~urface and percolating water, unanimously declare that 
the use thereof cannot be acquired by prescriptive user. 
It is not the type or kind of water described in Sullivan 
1JS. Northern Spy Mining Co., 11 Utah 438, 40 Pac. 709, 
55 A.L.R. 1448, but rather it classifies under the heading 
of percolating water "rising in the form of a bog or 
utarsh" as was involved in Willow Creek Irri,gation Co. 
v. Michaelssen, supra, or underground percolating 'vater 
of Cresent Mining Co. vs. Silver King Mining Co., supra. 
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Allowing the evidence in this case its maximum 
thrust in favor of plaintiff, it falls far short of estab-
lishing and identifying the water on defendant's lands 
as being water subject to appropriation or the use of 
which may be obtained by prescription. Part of this 
vvater was and is undoubtedly a component part of the 
earth owned by defendant, percolating through defend-
ant's soil and finally coming to the su~·face to forn1 
bogs or marshes. It can be surmised that other parts 
of it represent melting sno\v and rain ''Thich have 
fallen on the surface of defendant's land and then 
drained to low places on his land. _Plaintiff's evidence 
does not even in1ply or suggest that any part of it 
ca1ne from artesian wells driven by pi~intiff in Sees. 
9 and 22. His evidence carefully eliminates this source 
because they were driven only within the last t\vo or 
three years. 
In resolving the conflict in evidence the court n1ade 
the following findings : 
''19. A small but uncertain amount of \Yater 
has accumulated during certain seasons of years 
upon lands of defendant situated in Sections 9 
and 22, Township 2, Range 5 East. Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, for 20 years prior to :Jiay 31~ 1955. 
It has not been and is not \Yater of the type, kind 
or quality that title thereto or use thereof can be 
acquired by prescription, adverse possession or 
adverse user, being either \Yaste \\~ater, surface 
\\rater or pereolating \\Tater. Such \\Tater has ac-
cuinulated in lo\Y places consisting of s\\~ales and 
1narsh)r arPas of tlu.•se seetions. It has ren1ained 
in lo"· arPa8 and has not flo\\·ed out upon adjoin-
in~ land. ~luch of the \\·ater js surface \Yater 
\\·hich "·as produced by rainfall and n1elting sno\YS. 
-tS 
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Its quantity has varied from year to year. During 
dry seasons of the years and during years of small 
or limited precipitation the small amount of water 
in these low areas disappeared and the low areas 
became mere bogs or mud holes. During certain 
periods of the years when water accumulated in 
these low places wandering cattle owned by plain-
tiff and others drank at these lo wplaces. Neither 
plaintiff nor his predecessors in title and interest 
have ever atternpted any appropriation of said 
water under the statutes of the State of Utah. 
This accurnulation of water does not originate or 
flow from any natural water course nor has it 
ever originated or flowed from any natural water 
course. A small proportion of this water is prob-
ably water which percolates and has percolated 
through the soil of defendant's lands and finally 
came to the surface in the low areas described. 
Said arnount of said water forms and has always 
for1ned a part of the realty which has belonged 
and now belongs to defendant. There is no kno\vn 
and defined subterranean strearn on defendant's 
land or in the vicinity thereof wherein this water 
rnight originate." 
The trial court found in favor of the defendant 
on this aspect of the case. He is therefore entitled upon 
appellate review to have the evidence and ever)T reason-
able inference fairly to be drawn therefrom to be viewed 
in the light rnost favorable to him. (Buehner Block Co. 
vs. Glezos, 6 lTtah 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517; Beck vs. J epp-
son, 1 lTtah 2d 127, 2()2 P. 2d 760.) 
Furtherrnore, when the testimony is conflicting the 
appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial 
court unless so manifestly erroneous as to den1onstrate 
some oversight or rnistake affecting the substantial rights 
of appellant. (Klopenstine vs. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57 
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Pac. 712; Singleton vs. K elly7 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63, 
66; Olivero v. Eleganti7 _ 61 Utah 475, 214 Pac. 313; 
McMonegal vs. l!-yritsch Loan and Trust Co.7 75 Utah 470, 
268 Pac. 635.) 
There is substantial evidence to sustain the fore-
going findings. It was the duty of the trial court to 
resolve the conflict, and having resolved the conflict in 
defendant's favor, the rules cited above apply. 
It is therefore the contention of defendant that 
under the law and facts of this case that plaintiff did 
not and could not acquire a prescriptive use of the 
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 for the 
reason that the proof shows they were either (a) waste 
or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or (c) percolat-
ing water, or a combination of same. The law denies 
that the use of such water may be obtained by prescrip-
tion, because such water is 'ltot "water" of the type, nature 
or kind subject to appropriation or prescriptive use. 
(B) In the alternative, if it be adjudged that the 
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 have been 
and are waters subject to the law of appropriation and 
prescription, then plaintiff did not and could not acquire 
a prescriptive use of sa1ne. 
In the event the Court refuses to adopt defendant's 
contention and theory above presented that the "\Yaters 
on defendant's land ''Tere not and are not subject to 
the law of appropriation and prescription and reaches 
the conclusion that they 'rere and are "\raters subject 
to appropriation and prescriptive user, then defendant 
e1nphatically asserts that plaintiff, under the la"\v of 
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l) tah, could not and did not acquire a prescriptive right 
to use same. 
Neither plaintiff nor defendant has n1ade any filing 
111 the office of the State Engineer appropriating said 
'vaters and neither of then1 have actually diverted said 
'vaters from their natural collecting basins by means 
of ditches, canals or other structures. Under this hypo-
thesis the waters are public waters under the quoted 
Constitutional provision, statutes and decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This court faces two alternatives: 
~1) it 1nust declare that these waters are not "water" 
under the water laws of Utah, but are waters of the 
type and kind described in Willow Creek and Crescent 
and not subject to appropriation or prescriptive user, 
or (:2) it must declare these waters to be public waters 
owned by the public. There is no other choice. The argu-
nlent which follows is submitted on the assumption (and 
"\Vithout de-emphasizing defendant's first contention and 
line of defense) that the Court adopts the second alterna-
tive. 
Defendant, in this brief, has summarized the history 
of present Sec. 73-9-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, from the 
year 1903 to the present which is the vital and determin-
jng statutory enactment in this case. The original 1903 
statute effective l\fay 11, 1903, during the passage of 
the years has been amended and re-written many times, 
but it has always retained either in form or substance 
this vital mandate: 
uRights to the use of any of the lUI a }JJJro pri--
ated water iu the StatP JJI((.,l! ue acquired by ((j)-
jJropriation, in the JJutnuer hereiJiafter jJrovided, 
and not otherwise." 
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As the cited decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
disclose, this provision of law (and its ainendments and 
amplifications) have been the subject of judicial con-
struction with resultant legislative amendments. How-
ever, one clear certain fact shines through all of the 
decisions (many of thern involving complicated and com-
plex situations) and legislation, and that is that the 
use of unappropriated public waters since May 11, 1903, 
ean be acquired only through the methods prescribed by 
the legislature "and not otherwise." As to these waters, 
the acquisition of same by prescription has been out-
lawed since May 11, 1903. 
The two decisions which announce this rule are 
Jlooppiania and Hammond v. Johnson. There has never 
been any deviation from the rule pronounced by then1 
and the rule therein laid down has been a fixed, un-
questioned rule in Utah since May 11, 1903. The contro-
versy which arose in connection with the interpretation 
of this statutory provision involved waters the use of 
uJhich had passed from the public to private ou'nerslzip 
and not as to waters which were ··public~· waters. The 
final forrn of the statute as it appears as Sec. 73-3-1, 
·utah Code Ann. 1953, represents the legislatiYe deter-
Inination that even as to ··prirate 1rater .. there can be 
no acquisition of use by prescription. All through the 
years the dispute has never involved the rule of Hoop-
piania and Hanunond as applied to public "~aters, but 
always as to \\~hether the statutory negation ··and not 
otherwise" applied to \Yaters the use of "Thich had passed 
froHl thP "publir." to "priYate o\\~nership. ·· ..._~n exainina-
tion and analysis of the cited decisions and of the many 
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authorities discussed and cited therein shows that the 
Supreme Court persistently made the distinction herein 
elucidated. It is in the cases where the use of water had 
passed to private ownership that the Court refused to 
apply what may be called the "not otherwise" rule 
governing public waters and engaged in discussions 
eoncerning the questions of abandonment, non-user, ad-
verse user, forfeiture, interruption in usage and the 
like questions. Lindsay graphically demonstrates the 
distinction. In that case the irrigation company had 
obtained a court decree fixing and determining the water 
rights in Little Bear River. Lindsay and its predecessor 
were not parties to the decree and continued to use 
water from the river not decreed to them. The contest 
\vas between private parties. Judge Larsen in Hammond 
pointed up the distinction in his declaration: 
"But neither abandonment nor forfeiture by 
non-user takes cognizance of or applies to a 
situation where a third party has entered the 
scene." (66 Pac. (2nd) at 900) 
Commencing with J\1arch 20, 1939, the Legislature ap-
plied the rule of Hooppiania and Hammond to private 
'vaters. If there has been and there is water on defend-
ant's said lands (an issue in this case) and the san1e 
is not waste or seepage water, surface or percolating 
'vater, then it always has been and is now "public water" 
within Hooppiania and Hammond. On this hypothesis, 
plaintiff never has acquired prescriptive use of sa1ne 
because of the prohibition of the statute effective fron1 
~lay 11, 1903, to the present date. If the date of filing 
plaintiff's cross-complaint (Jan. 6, 1956) be taken, then 
the elapsed time since May 11, 1903, is 52 years, 7 
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rnonths and 25 days. If the date plaintiff commenced 
r~his action (May 31, 1955) be taken then the elapsed 
time is 52 years and 20 days. During all of this time 
the 1903 statute and its amendments and amplifications 
absolutely prohibited the plaintiff from acquiring the 
right to the use of the water by prescription. The findings 
of the jury is to the effect that plaintiff and his pre-
decessors in ownership used said water holes for 50 
consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955. Plaintiff and 
his predecessors therefore commenced to use said water 
on May 31, 1905, but at this time the 1903 statute was 
operative as to this water, and forbade the initiation 
of a period of prescriptive user. It is repeated that 
neither plaintiff nor defendant has applied to the State 
Engineer to appropriate said water, as mandated by 
~tatute if rights to use same were to be acquired, nor 
has any diversionary works been erected. 
It is interesting to note that plaintiff's witness, 
Pierre Castagne, is 50 years old (R. 246); that plaintiff's 
"vitness, Tony Castagno, is 53 years old (R. 293); that 
plaintiff's witness, Rose Castagno, fixed the years 1936-
1937 as the time she first "helped ''ith live stock" in 
connection with the Cassity-Castagno land (R. 301, 302, 
:-303) ; that plaintiff's "\vitness, Wanless, first \Vorked for 
plaintiff and on his land in 1941 (R. 308) .. A .. s to Pierre 
and Tony, 1nanifestly their n1e1nories at the maximum 
cannot go back for n1ore than 40 or 45 years. As to 
l~ose, her testin1ony would encon1pass a period of 20 
years at the maxiinuin. As to Wanless, 15 years only 
are within his me1nory. The plaintiff, himself~ was vague 
and gave no date as to com1nence1nent of use of the 
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\Vaters. He stated that "cattle drank at the holes as 
long as he can remember." (R. 65). Manifestly this testi-
Inony does not prove any use prior to lVfay 11, 1903 (R. 
89). It is directed to the time subsequent to said date-
all within the interdicted period. The jury's finding 
that plaintiff and his predecessors used said water holes 
for 50 consecutive years prior to lVfay 31, 1955, means 
exactly what it says. The underlying evidence would not 
support a finding of usage prior to May 31, 1905. 
Under this state of the law and the facts, defendant 
contends and submits, that plaintiff obtained no prescrip-
tive right to use these waters. It becomes entirely im-
material as to when the defendant's lands passed fron1 
ownership of the United States to private ownership. 
The doctrine of Sullivan v. Northern Spy Mining Co., 
supra, as recognized by the Act of Congress of July 26, 
1866 ( 43 U.S.C.A. 661) is to the effect that 
"To initiate and acquire a right in and to 
the use of unappropriated public \Vater, "rhether 
on the public domain or '.vithin a reservation or 
elsewhere, is dependent upon the la'.vs or custon1s 
of the state in which the water is found." (Sew--
ards v. 111 ea9hcr, 37 t:tah 212, 108 Pac. 212) 
governs the situation as disclosed by the evidence in 
this case. Under the lavv of the State of Utah, plaintiff 
could acquire by prescription no rights in the \Yater 
on defendant's land. 
With the disappearance of plaintiff's alleged rights 
in the water there also disappears any rights of ingress 
or egress for its enjoyment. Such implied easement 
1nust find its existence in the right to the water and 
\vhen no right to the water exists there is no easement 
(Wendler v. Woodward, 93 Wash. 684; 161 Pac. 1043). 
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PARTB 
ANAL Y'SIS OF APPELLANT'S 
OF ERRORS IN ARGUMENTS 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEMONSTRATION 
POINTS I AND II. It is respectfully submitted 
that Respondent in Part A - Respondent's Argument 
and Demonstration of Validity of Judgment- has fully 
demonstrated the validity of the judgment in this case 
in his favor and has thereby shown to the Court that 
Appellant's argun1ents in support of these points in his 
brief are unsound and not supported by either the law 
or the facts in this case. It is believed that there is no 
necessity of further comment on these points. 
POINT III covers rulings of the trial Court in the 
exclusion of evidence. Each ruling will be treated separ-
ately. 
1. The excluded evidence pertained to a supposed 
right to trail cattle fron1 an area marked on P Ex. I in 
pink bearing the figure ~'3" to the ""old homestead" being 
shown on said exhibit in pink and n1arked 'Yith the figure 
"2." In none of Plaintiff's pleadings did he allege any 
such trail "\vay easement. The basis of his claim for 
such easement related only to trailing cattle to and fron1 
Stansbury Island (R. 258, 259, 260, 263). Plaintiff's alle-
gations in paragraph 1 of his first separate defense 
(Record of Appeal, Plaintiff's .... ~ns,Yer to Defendant's 
cross clailns) are definitely tied to the so-called Stans-
bury Island "trail"~ay." The atte1npted production of 
this evidence at the trial "\Yas a surprise to Respondent 
as there was no "\Yarning pleading of any such claim. 
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l_"'he Court properly struck such evidence (R. 263). 
2. Appellant propounded this question to the Wit-
ness Pierre Castagno: 
"Do you have an opinion, Pierre, as to how 
the quantity of forage consu1ned and trampled 
down, by 1naking this trail use of your brother 
(Respondent) would compare to the quantity of 
forage which his land about which you have just 
testified~ ( R. 269). 
In explanation of this question Appellant's counsel said: 
"I believe it shows he n1ade use of these 
lands for the period which we are here involved 
with a certain number of head of cattle and a 
certain vvay. What I a1n trying to show is how 
that use compares to the total quantity of forage 
which is supported or produced by the lands, he, 
himself, owns within this very area." (R. 270). 
The "he" referred to in the explanation is the Respondent, 
Castagno (R. 270). The Court then asked: '"Are you 
trying to compare damages now}" (R. 270). Appellant's 
counsel responded: "It would have that result, yes." 
( R. 270). The Court sustained Respondent's objection 
to this question. The ruling was proper as the answer 
of this witness to this question would in no sense bear 
on the question of damages accruing to the Respondent 
by virtue of the Appellant using Respondent's ]and as 
a trailway. The comparison between the amount of forage 
consumed by Appellant's cattle on Respondent's lands 
and the total amount the land would produce is not the 
correct measure of da1nages for the trespass (52 AllL J ur. 
-Trespass-Sec. 49, pp. 873-875). 
3. The excluded testimony pertained to an alleged 
conversation between Appellant and Appellant's deceased 
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father-in-law relative to the quantity and quality of 
water in the so-called "water holes" (R. 278, 279). The 
testimony was hear say. (Jones on Evidence (Ed. De 
Luxe) Sec. 297; Wigmore's Code of Evidence, Rule 147, 
P. 259). 
4. This action \vas tried in January, 1957. Appel-
lant's counsel propounded this question to Appellant: 
"Have you seen cattle watering in thi'S dry year?" (Em-
phasis supplied). The answer was "Yes." The complaint 
in this action was filed on May 31, 1955. Upon motion 
of Respondent the Court struck Appellant's ans\Yer. 
'l,hereupon Appellant was asked by his counsel: "Is this 
as dry a year as during any of the years prior to 1955 ?" 
(R. 282). The witness answered: "Yes." He was then 
asked: "Is it drier~" Objection \vas sustained. The Court 
'vas correct in its ruling. The condition in 1957 - ''This 
year" (which was subsequent to the conn11encement of 
the action) was not a proper reference base upon which 
to draw an inference as to prior conditions. 
5. The following excerpt applies to this alleged 
error: 
"Q. Do you know, ~Ir. Cassity, approxi-
mately when the hon1estead \Yas filed by ~Ir. 
Castagno on the lands 1narked 'Yith a "nu1neral 
2~" 
"THE COURT: Hasn't that been stipulated~ 
"1\IR. OMAN: As to the date the patent \Yas 
issued, but not the date he filed it. 
"1\[R,. RITER: That is in1n1aterial, and I ob-
ject to it. 
"THE COl TRT: Do yon object on the ground 
that it's not the best evidence~ 
"l\ rR. RITER: Yes. 
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained.'' 
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It requires no citation of authorities to show that Appel-
lant could not prove matters pertaining to the homestead 
application of Castagno by mere oral statements of 
Cassity as to date of filing of the ho1nestead application 
by Castagno in the Federal General Land Office. No 
foundation was laid for the admission of this secondary 
evidence. If relevant and rna terial to the issues in this 
case there was a way of proving such facts, but not by 
the method followed by Appellant in this instance. The 
best evidence rule clearly forbids such method of proof. 
rrhere was no error. 
6. This alleged error in exclusion of evidence will 
be discussed hereafter in connection with the discussion 
of Point V of Appellant's brief. 
POINT IV. Through clerical error the Findings 
of Fact and the Judgment erroneously attributed to 
the Respondent ownership of the following land: 
NW14NE1;4; NE14N\V1;4; SW~NvV14 and vV:lf2-
SW~, Twp 2South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake 
Base and l\feridian. 
This land in truth is owned by Appellant .. The owner-
ship paragraph of Finding 3 and Paragraph 7 (A) of 
the Judgment should be corrected by eliminating said 
lands froin an adjudication of Respondent's ownership. 
POINT V. Appellant asserts that a "promissory 
estoppel" exists as against Respondent as a justification 
of Appellant over running Respondent's land with cattle 
owned by Appellant. This claim is based on fragmentary 
evidence given by the Respondent on a Rule 43 (b) 
examination at the trial (R. 10, 11). Appellant's plead-
jngs in this case raise no such issue. Neither in his 
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original complaint nor in his supplemental complaint 
did he make allegations that his alleged right to trail 
cattle over Respondent's land was based on conduct 
of Respondent which created an estoppel. 
"In pleading an estoppel in pais, the rule 
prevails that the plea must be certain in every 
particular, and must allege every material fact 
which the pleader expects to prove or upon which 
the estoppel is predicated. The estoppel must be 
pleaded with the same fullness and particularity 
as are required in cases involving like subjects of 
inquiry in suits in equity." 19 Am. J ur. Estoppel 
Sec. 193." (Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms 
-Estoppel, Vol. 8, P. 181). 
Under this argument, estoppel - whether it be in pais 
or a so-called "promissory estoppel - is "an element 
oi the cause of action." It must be pleaded. (Berow etal 
~us. Shields et ux, 48 Utah 270, 159 Pac. 538; Barber vs. 
Anderson, 73 Utah, 375 274 Pac. 136; Annotation 120 
ALR 105). Respondent again invites the Court's atten-
tion to the fact that Appellant's case, as based on his 
pleadings, is based solely on the clailn of prescriptive 
user. The trial court properly struck the evidence relating 
to an alleged transaction pertaining to the ''hon1estead" 
land of Respondent (R. 11) in vie"\Y of the state of the 
pleadings. However, it should be noted that .... \.ppellant's 
counsel did not at the ti1ne of the trial clann it supported 
the clain1 of an estoppel. He asserted ''* * * but now he 
(Castagno) has refused to sell that out, because of things 
which have transpired bet,veen the parties here, and 
he has co1ne to interfere "\Yith this operation of Cassity. 
I claim that actually-." For the foregoing reason, the 
Court was correct in striking the evidence pertaining 
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to an alleged agreement of the Respondent to sell Appel-
lant the '~ho1nestead" land (R. 10, 11). (See also Point 
II, 5 of Appellant's brief at page 28), and in not allowing 
Appellant's counsel to pursue such line of questioning. 
It will be noted that Respondent acted promptly to 
eliminate testimony on this point as soon as it became 
apparent the purpose thereof (R. 10, 11). 
CONCLUSION 
The vein of thought runs through Appellant's brief 
that his claimed necessity of using Respondent's land 
for the operation of his live stock business, gives him 
some kind of legal right to subordinate it to his use and 
convenience regardless of the rights of Respondent. 
The judgment in this case denies such philosophy. It 
upholds the doctrine that each man should use his own 
property in such manner as not to injure his neighbor. 
'rhe judgment should be affirmed, except to the cor-
rection of the clerical error above noted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
Attorney for Respondent 
Suite 312 Kearns Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, 1Jtah 
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